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Introduction 
 
“Great powers have great currencies.”  Robert Mundell (1993) 
 
With China’s emergence as a major economic power, the Renminbi (RMB) has become increasingly 
important in global financial markets. Whilst the RMB had no international influencei in the early 
2000s, it is now the fifth most-used currency for international payments and part of the International 
Monetary Fund’s basket of global reserve currencies (IMF, 2015). The main policy channel 
facilitating this growing use of RMB is the Renminbi Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor 
(RQFII) scheme established in 2011. This approval system permits foreign investors to invest 
offshore RMB raised in designated international financial centres (IFCs) into Chinese securities for 
the first time. The geographical expansion of the RQFII scheme is increasingly giving global 
investors alternatives to the US dollar as the dominant currency. The internationalisation of the RMB, 
and the rise of state capitalism underpinning this development, therefore fundamentally challenges 
how we think about the distribution of power in the international financial system. 
These shifts in financial power are beginning to reshape established IFC hierarchies. Securing 
early approval from the Chinese government under the RQFII scheme equips IFCs with a 
competitive advantage over their rivals. It provides the exclusive right to use RMB offshore for trade, 
settlement and RMB-denominated assets, and thus increases the attractiveness of an IFC for global 
investors. Furthermore, once Chinese capital markets are fully liberalised, the total number of RQFII 
hubs will surge. Early approval allows more time to develop expertise in RMB products and integrate 
them into existing financial structures. IFCs with an established track record in RMB finance are then 
more likely to retain the confidence of global investors. This suggests that the Chinese government 
directly affects the distribution of power between IFCs, by granting early RQFII approval to some 
centres but excluding others. Understanding the dynamics behind the development of offshore RMB 
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centres is therefore critical to explain IFC competition in the decade ahead. Yet, empirical research 
on this topic remains scarce. 
We address this empirical gap in the literature, by investigating how the interplay between 
state and private interests has shaped London’s development as an offshore RMB centre. London was 
the first foreignii RQFII hub to be approved by the Chinese government in 2013. The subsequent 
development of London’s infrastructure to access and process RMB payment flows has, however, 
lagged behind other RQFII hubs. Money centres such as Singapore have now overtaken London in 
terms of allocated RQFII quota and RMB trading volumes (SWIFT, 2014). This study seeks to 
analyse the drivers behind this shift and explain the uneven development of London’s offshore RMB 
hub. Understanding this U-turn in London’s RQFII experience from first-mover to relative laggard 
provides important insights into why some RMB trading centres succeed, whereas others fall behind 
their competition. The UK’s recent ‘Brexit’ vote makes these insights particular timely, by providing 
a foundation for understanding how London’s appeal as the leading RMB gateway to European 
markets evolves in the future.  
To investigate this puzzle, we draw on an original dataset of 121 multi-stakeholder interviews 
conducted in London and China’s main financial and political centres: Shanghai, Beijing, Hong 
Kong and Shenzhen. This dataset covers the year in which London’s RMB centre was created and its 
subsequent development. This enabled us to adopt a longitudinal approach, by tracing the co-
evolution of state and private sector interests across time and space. Interviews were then verified 
against Chinese and UK government documents and financial news sources. Such data triangulation 
allowed for constructing a nuanced account of how state-private tensions shape the selective 
absorption of RMB finance into London’s financial architecture.  
This empirical analysis makes an important conceptual intervention, by extending politically 
sensitive readings of the international financial system (Agnew 2009, 2012; Eichengreen, 2012; 
Cohen, 2015). London’s development as an offshore RMB centre demonstrates the need to examine 
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what Agnew (2009) terms transnational ‘money games’: It is the relationship between finance and 
state power, both within and outside state jurisdictions, that is central to understanding global finance. 
We take this work as our conceptual starting point to examine the development of RMB finance in 
London. Our analysis borrows from organisational sociology on ‘mimetic isomorphism’ (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983) and its applications to global finance (Djelic and Quack 2007; Bassens et al 2013). 
These works examine how seemingly ‘universal’ economic practices require context-specific 
adaptation when entering new institutional landscapes. They emphasise how companies tend to 
replicate organisational ‘best practice’ of a recognised lead firm, with the aim of ultimately 
supplanting the leader. Whilst these insights are instructive for our discussion on institutional 
adaptation, the notion of mimicking an acknowledged leader does not apply in this case. As the first 
foreign RMB centre established outside Chinaiii, London constitutes new testing ground for how 
RMB finance adapts to Western institutional contexts. Consequently, there is no proven ‘best 
practice’ to follow. It is in this context of uncertainty that our analysis of London’s RMB centre 
becomes important for advancing existing explanations of institutional adaptation. 
This paper makes several important contributions to literatures on IFCs and state-finance 
relations.  It challenges the view within the political economy literature that financial globalisationiv 
has led to the retreat of the state (Büthe and Mattli, 2011). Following the work of Agnew (2009, 
2012), we propose an alternative reading of the state that emphasises its active role as a financial 
market architect. By investigating the case of London, it is demonstrated that the development of 
offshore RMB centres is best understood as selective adaptation. What makes London’s adaptation to 
RMB finance ‘selective’ is the shift in state-private bargaining dynamics from strategic alignment 
toward an increasing bifurcation of interests. This study therefore adds to our understanding of which 
features reflect mimicry of ‘universal’ practices and which are ‘context-specific’ in the development 
of new financial product markets (Bassens et al, 2013).  
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There has also been renewed interest among social scientists in offshore financial space 
following the 2008 global financial crisis. Recent works have emphasised legal features such as 
entire offshore jurisdictions in attracting offshore financial activity (Clark et al, 2015; Wainwright, 
2011). This study extends these insights, by highlighting the need to politicise the analysis of 
offshore finance. It seeks to broaden our understanding of the role played by the state beyond 
conventional regulatory functions: Governments not only act as regulators or stabilisers of offshore 
financial space; they actively create it. 
 This paper unfolds in four parts. The first part outlines the paper’s conceptual premises 
grounded in economic geographic theory. The second part presents the dataset and methodology. The 
third part discusses the empirical findings. It first contextualises the geographical distribution of 
offshore RMB centres, by teasing out the political drivers behind the creation of the first foreign 
RMB centre in London. Subsequently, changes in state-private interests are analysed and how these 
affect the integration of RMB finance into London’s IFC architecture. The paper concludes, by 
summarising the results and outlining implications for policy and future research.  
 
Conceptualising Institutional Adaptation in Offshore RMB Centres  
 
The development of and relations between financial centres have commonly been explored through 
the conceptual lens of location-specific complementarities (Clark, 2002; Faulconbridge, 2004) and 
shared commonalities that facilitate collaboration between centre-specific institutionsv (Wójcik, 
2013). This has led to a focus on structural explanations including legal frameworks, political 
systems, labour flows and cultural norms (Hall, 2010). Within this literature, most research highlights 
the relationships between Western IFCs such as the ‘New York-London axis’ (Wójcik, 2013) and 
London-Frankfurt relations (Beaverstock et al, 2005). This has led to a focus on explaining 
institutional stability over institutional change, whereas questions of politics and power have been 
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sidelined, especially in non-Western contexts. 
 To bring the IFC literature into closer dialogue with the politics of change in Chinese finance, 
we combine insights from political geography and political economy on global finance. Political 
geographers emphasise the role of the state in shaping the spatial underpinnings of different currency 
regimes (Agnew 2009; Cohen 2011). Accordingly, the transition of currencies from a nationally 
confined status toward transnational or reserve currency status is shaped by the strategic motivations 
behind governments’ ‘money games’ and the political-economic circumstances in which they are 
embedded (Agnew 2012). We apply these insights to the largely unexplored field of RMB centres, by 
exploring how state-private relations shape their development. 
  For this purpose, the emphasis on government incentives in political geography is coupled 
with insights on political bargaining in Chinese political economy and China area studies. This 
literature tends to focus on the role of firm-government bargaining in regional development (Hu and 
Lin, 2013) including foreign direct investment policies (Wei, 2015), notably in industrial sectors such 
as Chinese car manufacturing (Chin, 2010, Oh, 2013). What unites these works is their emphasis on 
interdependent bargaining between Chinese political elites, vested domestic interests and foreign 
investors to explain economic outcomes.  
 With a few notable exceptions (Chen et al, 2015; Töpfer, 2015), the area of indirect foreign 
investmentsvi has, however, been less frequently studied. This paper adds to this growing body of 
research, by extending the conceptual premises of interdependent bargaining beyond the firm-
government nexus and applying them to government-IFC relations. We conceptualise the 
development of offshore RMB centres as a bargaining outcome between the Chinese government and 
financial sector and state agents operating within an RQFII-licensed IFC. Rather than concentrating 
on self-reinforcing complementarities, the main premise is that agents will seek to change 
institutional features of RMB centres if they no longer satisfy their interests. This echoes the 
emphasis on conscious political choices in political geography and is the defining feature of what we 
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term ‘selective adaptation’. We posit that the adaptation of established IFC architectures to RMB 
finance becomes ‘selective’ if state-private sector bargaining shifts from strategic alignment toward a 
bifurcation of interests. Such changes can be triggered by external shocks such as financial crises, or 
due to gradual learning effects that may alter agent preferences (Hall and Thelen, 2009). This focus 
on political bargaining dynamics provides a useful heuristic for examining how adaptation occurs in 
situations of uncertainty when no ‘best practice’ template exists for agents to follow. This responds to 
calls for examining how agency shapes financial geographies (Coe et al, 2014) and adds to the 
literature on institutional isomorphism (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983; Bassens et al, 2013).  
 Analysing offshore RMB centres also requires conceptualising ‘offshore finance’. Based on 
the global financial networks literature (Coe et al, 2014), recent works have conceptualised places of 
offshore finance as ‘any jurisdiction through which financial claims pass to avoid policy constraints 
elsewhere’ (Kurdle, 2013:2). Applying this definition to the analysis of RMB centres clarifies that 
offshore finance is not about any type of financial services; it is about the booking of financial claims, 
also known as financial instruments or assets (Clark et al, 2015). For example, if a UK company 
holding RQFII quota issued in London provides advice on RMB investments to an American 
company without RQFII quota, this is not treated as offshore financevii. However, if the same UK 
firm sold some of its own RQFII quota to the American company for RMB market access, then this 
would count as offshore finance.  
 Equating places of offshore finance with ‘jurisdictions’ nonetheless risks downplaying the 
role of the state. The global expansion of RMB centres is not driven by the ability of their legal 
system to ‘avoid policy constraints’, as Kurdle’s definition suggests. It serves the purpose of 
satisfying the Chinese government’s strategic objectives to promote the more widespread use of 
RMB in international transactions. This suggests that the legal emphasis in ‘offshore jurisdictions’ is 
not sufficient to capture the political underpinnings in offshore RMB finance. Recent works have 
acknowledged that governments are important agents in offshore finance, as they devise national and 
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international laws and even create new places of offshore finance (Clark et al, 2015). This paper 
extends these works on IFC ‘offshore jurisdictions’, by specifying how state-firm bargaining shapes 
their development.  
 
Data and Methods 
Grounded in new economic geography research, the main objective of this study is to trace the 
evolution of London’s offshore RMB hub. The City’s RMB market covers various financial 
activities. These include foreign exchange trading, commercial and private banking and market-
specific investment products such as RQFII quota required to purchase Chinese securities. These 
activities are first approved by Chinese financial authorities and then undertaken by Chinese, British 
and international banks, law firms and asset managers. These financial institutions are supported 
through UK financial authorities including the Bank of England, HM Treasury and the London Stock 
Exchange. Grasping how London’s RMB market developed requires a detailed understanding of the 
characteristics, practices and relations of these financial institutions and policymakers. Using 
snowball sampling, in-depth personal interviews were chosen as the predominant form of inquiry to 
investigate such micro-level factors. Interview questions were divided into two sub-sections. The first 
section investigated the policy motivations and external environment that gave impetus to the RQFII 
scheme in the context of RMB internationalisation. The second section explored the specific role that 
London plays in this process relative to other offshore RMB centres. 
 This study faced two challenges: untangling the cross-cultural nature of RMB networks in 
London, and tracing their evolution over time. To ensure the validity of findings across geographical 
contexts and time horizons, the method of triangulation was applied. This study draws on an original 
dataset of 121 multi-stakeholder interviews carried out in London and China’s main financial and 
political centres, that is, Beijing, Shanghai, Hong Kong and Shenzhen. This dataset covers a period of 
three years, which spans the year of London’s RQFII approval in 2013 until 2015. This enabled us to 
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account for shifts in attitudes and decision-making over an extended time horizon and across 
geographical locations. In China, 75 elite interviews were carried out. These focused on officials 
from the main R/QFII administrative authorities, namely the Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC), State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) and People’s Bank of China (PBOC). 
Relevant offshore counterparts in Hong Kong included the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) 
and Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE).  
To gauge the extent to which RMB finance has been integrated into London, 46 interviews 
were conducted with London-based executives from Chinese and non-Chinese financial services 
institutions. These included banks involved in RMB trading and China-dedicated practice groups of 
securities law firms. Follow-up interviews were carried out with the aforementioned respondents in 
China and London. This allowed for longitudinal comparison of policy motivations and private sector 
attitudes towards the role of RMB finance in London’s IFC development. 
Potential bias may nonetheless be introduced, as some regulators and financial institutions 
may strategically downplay or hide political interference. To ensure the robustness of findings, 
responses from Chinese political elites were triangulated with responses from other important 
stakeholder groups. These included the Stock Exchange Committees in Shanghai (SHSE) and 
Shenzhen (SZSE) and government think-tanks such as the Institute of World Economics and Politics 
(IWEP). Similarly, financial sector interviews in London were verified against responses from the 
Bank of England (BOE) and UK Treasury, which oversee the City’s RQFII hub. These multi-
stakeholder interviews were cross-checked against Chinese and English news sources including 
South China Morning Post, Xinhua and Financial Times, and official documents from PBOC, SAFE 
and CSRC. UK equivalents included policy reports from the UK Treasury and National Office for 
Statistics. Overall, this triangulation methodology minimised the interpretational freedom of 
interview responses across cultural contexts and allowed for reconstructing how London’s RMB 
centre evolved over time. 
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Results and Discussion: Contextualising London’s first-mover advantage 
 
Before examining London’s development path as an RMB centre, it is necessary to contextualise its 
creation, by analysing the decision-making process behind its initial selection as the first RMB hub 
outside Asia. This provides an important foundation for understanding what drives the uneven 
geographical distribution of offshore RMB centres.  
 The 2008 global financial crisis triggered a paradigm shift in Chinese policy attitudes. It eroded 
the legitimacy of the Anglo-American financial model and strengthened the view across the spectrum 
of Chinese elite opinion that the notion of ‘free markets’ is a ‘Western trap’ to undermine Chinese 
sovereignty (Kirshner, 2014). China’s over-reliance on the US dollar resulted in excessive exposure 
to global liquidity crises, which undermined trade finance (SAFE, personal interview, April 2014). 
Such spill-over effects were a key concern for the Chinese party leadership since sustained economic 
growth continues to depend on trade. It is against this backdrop that the Chinese authorities decided 
to develop the RMB into a global reserve currency to reduce dependency on Western markets and 
thus maintain financial stability in the long-run (PBOC, 2009). Capital market reforms such as the 
launch of the RQFII scheme in 2011 provided a central link to achieve this objective. Creating 
incentives for foreign investors to hold RMB-denominated assets would boost the inflow of RMB 
into domestic capital markets and thus promote the use of RMB in international transactions (PBOC, 
personal interview, June 2014). The advent of the RQFII scheme should therefore be understood 
from the perspective of externally induced shifts in Chinese political choices. A global offshore RMB 
market provided a strategic tool to leverage domestic capital market development for the purpose of 
RMB internationalisation and thus ensure stable economic growth. 
Initially, the RQFII programme was only open to Hong Kong-based subsidiaries of Mainland 
Chinese firms. This provided Chinese policymakers with a regional testing ground for RMB 
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internationalisation (SZSE, personal interview, June 2014). Given its de facto role as China’s 
offshore financial centre, Hong Kong has by far the largest deposits of RMB outside Mainland China 
(HKMA, 2015). It was thus the obvious choice in geographical location to experiment with the 
development of the RMB offshore market in a controlled regional setting. This is also reflected in the 
RQFII quota allocation, as Hong Kong still holds the single largest quota volume granted to any IFC 
(Figure 1). In 2013, the Chinese authorities extended the RQFII scheme to all foreign investors, 
providing that these are domiciled in Hong Kong. This clarifies that the home bias in selecting RMB 
centres has an inclusive effect: What mattered is not a firm’s country of origin but its chosen 
geographical location. The necessity for foreign investors to register their entities in Hong Kong to 
access RMB assets was designed to reinforce Hong Kong’s location-specific competitive advantage 
over other IFCs (HKSE, personal interview, May 2014). Hong Kong’s close relational proximity to 
Mainland China therefore translated into a powerful resource for establishing itself as the main RMB 
gateway under the ‘one country, two systems’ framework. 
Given the policy emphasis on controlled regional experimentation, the subsequent expansion 
of the RQFII scheme is perplexing. London was chosen to become the world’s first foreign RMB 
centre, even outcompeting regional Asian competitors such as Singapore, Seoul and Taipei (Figure 1). 
This clarifies that RMB deposits alone cannot explain which IFCs receive early RQFII approval. If 
that were the case, Taipei would have been chosen before London since Taiwan’s RMB pools are 
only second to Hong Kong and far exceed those in Europe (Hsu, 2014).  
Financial trading volumes offer a plausible explanation. Alongside New York, London 
continuously ranks top in this respect. To accelerate RMB internationalisation, it made sense for the 
Chinese government to leverage the financial power of these leading foreign exchange trading 
centres (SAFE, personal interview, April 2014). Yet, New York has thus far remained outside the 
club of offshore RMB centres. The exclusion of Taiwan and New York therefore suggests that there 
is another important variable at play, which trading volumes and RMB liquidity cannot capture.  
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[Insert figure 1 here] 
 
What unites the cases of Taiwan and New York is that the relations of their respective governments 
with China are relatively weak compared with the UK and Singapore. For example, Taiwanese 
relations with China have been tense since the 1949 Chinese civil war, due to which bilateral trade 
has suffered (IWEP, personal interview, November 2015). Chinese policymakers have therefore used 
RQFII access as a ‘bait’ to revive economic relations, by making Taiwan’s RQFII approval 
conditional on its ratification of a Cross-Strait trade deal (RQFII-licensed bank, personal interview, 
November 2013). In light of anti-China protests, the Taiwanese government retreated from the trade 
deal, thus giving the Chinese government an excuse to put RQFII approval on hold (RQFII-licensed 
asset manager, personal interview, June 2014).  
 Similarly, New York is not among RQFII licence holders despite its status as a leading 24-
hour trading centre. According to Chinese policymakers, the ‘US is not a destination for Renminbi 
[trading]’ (CSRC, personal interview, April 2014). In fact, it conflicts with China’s policy goals to 
reduce dependency on the US dollar in trade finance. Reciprocally, the political appetite in the US for 
establishing an RMB centre is limited. One reason is that the American government has accused 
China of currency manipulation, thus straining Sino-US relations (SFC, personal interview, May 
2014). Furthermore, the RMB is seen as a viable alternative to the US dollar as a reserve currency 
(RQFII-licensed bank, personal interview, April 2014). The cases of Taiwan and New York therefore 
demonstrate that bilateral tensions between China and an IFC’s respective home government have an 
exclusionary effect on securing privileged RMB hub status. 
 In contrast, London’s strategy of nurturing relational proximity with Chinese policymakers 
paved the way for its first-mover advantage in the offshore RMB network. Whilst London received 
RQFII status in 2013, the UK government had been pushing for RMB rights long beforehand. These 
aspirations were rooted in the context of the 2008 crisis, which clarified that staying competitive in 
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the global IFC landscape required London to enter new markets (London-based investment bank, 
personal interview, June 2015). As part of this reorientation strategy, the City turned to RMB-
denominated trading alongside other newly emerging forms of financial services provision including 
Islamic finance (Bassens et al 2010) and climate finance (Knox-Hayes, 2013). To exploit the 
opportunities afforded by RMB finance, policymakers and financial professionals alike were keen to 
develop London’s capabilities as a leading RMB centre (London-based securities law firm, personal 
interview, February 2015). These objectives matched China’s strategic interests of expanding the 
RMB’s use in international payments to overcome its limited convertibility (IWEP, personal 
interview, April 2014). 
High-profile state visits provided an important tool to cultivate close relations and mutual 
policy agendas. For example, the Chinese vice-premier was invited to visit the UK in September 
2011, after which a joint plan was announced to transform London into a leading RMB centre (BOE, 
personal Interview, November 2015). Sino-UK ties were further strengthened when the British 
Chancellor of the Exchequer announced that London would launch a forum with the Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority to promote RMB-denominated trade (HM Treasury, 2012). British banks and 
financial institutions backed this policy agenda. They urged the UK Treasury to obtain RQFII status 
to secure a major share of what they viewed as a rapidly growing market in foreign exchange and 
bond issuance (HM Treasury, personal interview, November 2013). This alignment of public-private 
interests on RMB finance was a decisive enabling mechanism for relational proximity with Chinese 
leaders, which helped secure RQFII privileges for Londonviii. 
Similarly, strategic gains for China and the UK were reciprocal. In exchange for RQFII hub 
status, Chinese policymakers were able to negotiate better investment conditions in overseas markets 
including for its sovereign fund (RQFII-licensed Chinese asset manager, personal interview, April 
2014). According to an official at the Hong Kong Stock Exchange,  
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‘It is all about exchanging policy gifts. London got the first RQFII hub beyond Hong Kong. In return, 
the British government has agreed to start talks to allow Chinese banks to set up wholesale units in 
the UK’ (personal interview, April 2014). 
 
The creation of London’s RMB hub and, by extension, the geographical distribution of RMB 
offshore centres, is thus best understood as an interdependent foreign policy game. UK and Chinese 
policymakers exchange resources they each require, whereby RQFII status represents the ‘golden 
carrot’. Successful approval depends on whether an IFC and the regulatory regime within which it is 
embedded can supply the Chinese government with the resources it requires to promote RMB 
internationalisation.   
 Location-specific advantages also contributed to London’s first-mover advantage. For 
example, as its time zone bridges the US, Europe and Asia, London accounts for 40 percent of global 
foreign exchange dealings, trading more dollars than New York and more euros than all of Europe 
combined (CityUK, 2015). This dominant position in currency markets is reflected in London’s 
highly skilled and internationally diverse labour force in the banking sector. London is a ‘genuine 
international financial centre - it dominates in forex [foreign exchange] markets and is much more 
outward looking than New York’ (London-based Chinese bank, personal interview, March 2015). 
This competitive edge in servicing international markets dates back to London’s pioneering role in 
developing Euro currency markets in the 1950s (Burns, 1999). Combined, this unique blend of 
institutional features provided both the resources needed for China’s closer financial integration with 
the West and an ideal launch pad for RMB internationalisation (PBOC, personal interview, March 
2014). This is reflected in several policy decisions: For one, the Chinese government selected 
London as the first IFC to issue an RMB-denominated bond outside China in 2012. Furthermore, it 
allocated RMB 80 billion in RQFII quota to London, thus outcompeting regional Asian competitors 
such as Singapore. Other leading money centres such as New York were considered to lack 
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‘the historic emphasis on foreign exchange markets […]. There isn’t the political appetite to work 
together [with Beijing] and London has a much longer commercial history with China, particularly 
through Hong Kong. [Compared to New York] this makes [London] a much more attractive RMB 
proposition (Chinese securities law firm, personal interview, March 2015). 
In sum, the evidence highlights that an IFC’s ability to leverage its financial capital and knowledge 
pools in RMB markets is conditioned by an inter-dependent exchange of resources with the Chinese 
state. In essence, RMB internationalisation is an economically driven process. But the political 
dividends of securing RQFII status are reserved to those money centres whose home jurisdictions 
have cultivated strong bilateral relations with China. Without such ties, an IFC is unlikely to secure 
RQFII approval even if it pools financial and knowledge-specific resources that the Chinese 
government desires. Accordingly, London was able to secure first-mover advantages because it 
offered a bundle of resources in direct support of RMB internationalisation, which its competitors 
were unable to offer.  
Selective Adaptation over Integration: London’s RQFII experience 
To understand the subsequent development of London’s offshore RMB centre, it is necessary to look 
beyond UK and Chinese policy motivations and examine the City’s internal adaptation process. This 
section shows that resistance among London’s private sector vis-à-vis China’s prescribed path of 
RMB internationalisation changed the nature of private-state bargaining dynamics, which resulted in 
the selective adaptation of the City’s financial architecture to RMB finance. Two main manifestations 
of selective adaptation stand out and warrant further analysis: the demand for RMB-denominated 
securities among London’s fund managers and the development of Chinese financial institutions 
within the City’s local market structures. Each of these features is discussed in turn.  
 
State capitalism versus private interests: Market demand for RMB-denominated assets 
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Although UK policymakers have expressed strong commitment to London’s RMB centre 
development, private sector appetite for RMB-denominated investment products has been limited. 
This discrepancy can be explained by fluctuations in Sino-UK relations and the effect this had on 
expectations among London’s financial community. For example, in April 2012, the UK government 
decided to host the Dalai Lama in London, which was viewed as a significant ‘faux pas’ by Chinese 
authorities (RQFII-licensed Chinese asset manager, personal interview, June 2015). The political 
relations between the UK and China ‘froze’ as a result (Chinese securities law firm, personal 
interview, March 2015). This effectively stalled London’s development as an offshore RMB centre 
throughout the remainder of 2012. This situation generated considerable uncertainty within London’s 
financial sector about the City’s future role in RMB internationalisation. Consequently, asset 
managers turned towards more stable Asian currency markets such as Japan and Korea, which 
undermined the demand for RMB-denominated assets (RQFII-licensed investment bank, personal 
interview, December 2015).  
To break the political deadlock and stimulate investment appetite for RMB investments, UK 
policymakers mobilised London’s financial sector as a foreign policy tool rather than relying on 
foreign office discussions. For example, in February 2013, the UK central bank governor visited his 
Chinese counterpart to discuss London’s future in offshore RMB finance. This meeting culminated 
with the UK being granted the privilege to launch an RMB-sterling currency swap line as the first G7 
country (BOE, personal interview, November 2015). These agreements are a key element of China’s 
RMB strategy, as they facilitate deeper financial and monetary integration with the signatory 
countries (PBOC, 2011). Another state visit to China followed shortly afterwards, in October 2013, 
where the British Chancellor of the Exchequer granted Chinese banks the privilege to establish 
wholesale branches in the UK (HM Treasury, personal interview, November 2013). These policy 
moves highlight the shift in the UK’s bargaining position: Maintaining a head start in the growing 
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offshore RMB market was dependent on adapting London’s regulatory infrastructure in line with 
Chinese demands and thus restore the relational proximity between UK and Chinese policymakers. 
The City’s private sector community, however, did not share this willingness to adapt. This is 
because the positive stabilisation effect that closer Sino-UK bilateral relations had on investor 
confidence was undermined by increased volatility in RMB currency markets (RQFII-licensed bank, 
personal interview, November 2013). Since 2009, the RMB had a virtual peg to the US dollar, which 
led many investors to bet on its appreciation (RQFII-licensed asset manager, personal interview, June 
2014). However, this trend came to a halt for two main reasons: first, in 2014, the US central bank 
ended its bond-buying programme aimed at lowering long-term interest rates, thus putting 
depreciation pressure on the RMB. Second, the Chinese government intensified this depreciation 
with three consecutive currency devaluations in 2015. This weakened the RMB’s value by over three 
percent (SHSE, personal interview, December 2015). These policy moves triggered a rush to invest 
in non-RMB funds as investors who had previously bet on RMB appreciation suffered considerable 
losses (RQFII-licensed asset manager, personal interview, December 2015). Consequently, this 
dampened the appetite for RMB-structured products, as the stable interest rate differentials to invest 
in such products were effectively wiped out (RQFII-licensed bank, personal interview, December 
2015). Paradoxically, this also undermined Beijing’s efforts to accelerate RMB internationalisation, 
by eroding confidence in the RMB as an investment currency and store of value. 
The low demand for RMB-denominated investments is best illustrated by the stagnation in RQFII 
quota and RMB flows passing through London in the wake of RMB volatility. Initially, the City’s 
RQFII quota of RMB 80 billion exceeded that of Asian competitors including Singapore and Korea, 
with RMB 50 billion each. However, the latter both received quota top ups of 50 percent and 100 
percent respectively, whereas London received none (Figure 2). This decision reflects the fact that 
demand for RQFII quota has been lowest in London among top-ranked RMB hubs. Both the overall 
quota allocation and their distribution across investor types illustrate this well (Figure 2). What 
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explains this leap forward by Singapore and Seoul is regional trade finance, which has been the main 
driver behind the demand for RQFII quota (SAFE, personal interview, April 2014). Although RMB 
volatility depressed quota demand worldwide, regional trade finance provided Singapore and Seoul 
with a buffer, since both are located in places with strong trade links to China. 
 
[Insert figure 2 here] 
 
RMB trading activity reveals a similar pattern. In 2014, Singapore overtook London as the 
top foreign IFC location for processing RMB payments: Its share of total offshore RMB trading 
flows increased to 6.8 per cent, whereas London accounted for 5.9 per cent (SWIFT, 2014). 
Processing trade payments with Asian neighbours using Chinese currency has provided a ‘regional 
testing ground’ to experiment with RMB internationalisation (SZSE, personal interview, June 2014). 
Unlike London, Singapore’s location in Southeast Asia, and its sizable build-up of RMB deposits, 
enable it to support China’s regional trade as the largest foreign exchange centre for Asian currencies 
(RQFII-licensed asset manager, personal interview, June 2014). Market-driven features such as RMB 
deposits may thus not determine which IFCs receive early RQFII approval but they do play a vital 
role in shaping which IFCs get ahead in the subsequent development of offshore RMB business. 
London’s relatively slower development therefore highlights an expectations-capabilities gap 
between the policy agenda for its role in RMB internationalisation and what can realistically be 
achieved without support from the private sector. Relational proximity between governments may go 
a long way in helping IFCs secure first-mover advantages in RMB finance but it does not guarantee 
their endurance.  
The evidence suggests that the development of offshore RMB centres needs to be understood 
as a two-fold sequencing process: Whereas the initial creation of RMB hubs is largely the result of 
intergovernmental bargaining, much of their subsequent development depends on the successful 
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alignment of politics and economics. The key arbiter in determining if offshore RMB markets 
develop is whether the private sector can identify and satisfy any underlying demand for RMB assets 
(BOE, 2012). The demand for RMB-denominated trade finance in East Asian markets therefore 
explains why IFCs in this region were able to overtake London, where the appetite for RMB 
securities remained relatively low. This point is instructive, as it suggests that location matters 
considerably in offshore RMB finance: Those IFCs situated within close geographical proximity to 
China benefit from the positive economic spill-over effects that inter-regional trade has on RMB 
markets.  
 
State capitalism versus private interests: Chinese commercial banks in London 
 
The selective adaptation of London’s financial architecture to RMB finance is also visible in the 
extent to which Chinese commercial banks are incorporated into the domestic labour market. Before 
2014, Chinese banks could only open subsidiaries rather than branches in London (London-based 
Chinese bank, personal interview, March 2015). This reflected the cautious and risk-adverse 
approach of UK regulatory authorities towards foreign banks following the 2008 financial crisis. 
Bank subsidiaries were favoured because they have more stringent liquidity and capital requirements 
compared to bank branches (BOE, personal interview, November 2015). This need to operate as 
tightly supervised subsidiaries made it difficult for Chinese banks to expand (London-based Chinese 
bank, personal interview, April 2015). In turn, this threatened London’s status as the leading Western 
RMB hub. 
To avoid losing this position, the UK government engineered a policy U-turn, by permitting 
Chinese banks to operate as branches instead. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China was the 
first Chinese bank to be granted a UK bank branch licence in 2014. These branch licenses enabled 
Chinese banks to better exploit the resources of their home lenders and move supervision to Beijing 
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authorities (London-based Chinese bank, personal interview, April 2015). Furthermore, the China 
Construction Bank was granted approval to open Europe’s first RMB clearing bank in London. 
Although the bank also started trading in Paris and Frankfurt later on, it made London its European 
headquarters (Fleming and Parker, 2014). This underscores that mutual political interests served as 
an initial enabling mechanism for inserting Chinese banks into London’s IFC architecture. 
Successful institutional insertion does, however, not equate to successful institutional 
integration. Whilst all four of the largest Chinese state-owned banks have now established local 
branches, their development within London is hampered by their limited engagement with the City’s 
labour force. This is reflected in their staffing policies, which are subject to strict controls by the 
Chinese government. In line with government requirements, Chinese offshore entities are managed 
by secondees from Mainland China rather than by local professionals (London-based Chinese bank, 
personal interview, March 2015). This is partly due to the so-called ‘party supervises the cadre’ rule 
(Dang Guan Ganbu) according to which the Chinese Communist Party appoints top managers in 
state-owned enterprises (Gong, 2014). Internal management appointments and career progression are 
all strictly controlled by party agencies rather than determined by market demand (IWEP, personal 
interview, April 2014). Consequently, this highlights the clash between the state-led labour market 
practices of Chinese banks and the market-led labour market standards within the City of London. 
This clash poses three main challenges for Chinese commercial banks operating in London. 
First, their rigid staffing policies impede the successful integration into London’s IFC infrastructure. 
Second, these same staffing policies prevent the stimulation of market-led incentives. Secondees are 
more focused on ‘managing their own careers [at home] rather than taking risks and making new 
business opportunities in London’ (London-based Chinese bank, personal interview, March 2015). 
Third, and as a direct consequence of the previous two points, Chinese financial institutions remain 
cut off from the pool of financial expertise and specialist financial services concentrated in the City. 
According to the head of the China practice group at a London-based securities law firm, 
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 ‘the reliance on Chinese talent is an issue [for Chinese banks in London] as there remains a lack of 
overlap between domestic and Chinese labour markets and this isn’t helping educate the wider 
market into the process of RMB internationalisation, London’s role within it and the opportunities 
for market participants that might exist’ (personal interview, March 2015).  
 
This clarifies that the regulatory grip over Chinese banks undermines their responsiveness to market 
needs and thus their ability to connect with financial knowledge flows in London. Consequently, this 
prevents their offshore operations from integrating effectively into London’s financial architecture, 
which Chinese policymakers had set out to achieve. These restrictions highlight that the Chinese 
party-state was not only a major enabling force behind London’s RQFII hub; ironically, it also acted 
as a ‘brakeman’, by prioritising state control over market demands. This exposes an inherent paradox 
in China’s RQFII strategy: Without letting market forces play a greater role in determining staffing 
policies, it will thus be difficult for Chinese financial institutions to fully leverage London’s 
locational advantages as a resource for RMB internationalisation.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper sought to explain the uneven development of London’s RMB trading centre. The City of 
London was the first foreign IFC approved by the Chinese government to become an offshore RMB 
centre. Despite this first-mover advantage, its subsequent development was hampered by the City’s 
selective adaptation to RMB finance, thus forfeiting its position as the largest offshore RMB hub 
outside Hong Kong. The findings show that this puzzling shift from first-mover to relative laggard 
can be explained by tracing how state and private sector interests co-evolved over time. Mutually 
reinforcing interests facilitated close relations between Chinese and UK policymakers, which enabled 
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London to become the first foreign offshore RMB hub. However, state-private sector interests started 
to diverge over the subsequent development of London’s RMB business. This was underpinned by 
financial sector’s limited appetite for RMB-denominated assets and the insufficient integration of 
Chinese banks into the City’s labour market. Combined, these factors led to the selective absorption 
of RMB finance into London’s financial architecture. This was not only reflected in the under-
allocation of RQFII licences; it also caused London’s share of the offshore RMB trading market to 
fall behind other money centres. 
These findings provide important insights for the IFC literature, by extending the focus 
beyond structural IFC complementarities such as knowledge and labour flows (Hall, 2010; Wójcik, 
2013). As the results demonstrated, it was the constant ad hoc bargaining between state and private 
agents with competing interests that explained the uneven development of London’s RMB hub. This 
suggests that the ideas of agents about political and economic outcomes matter considerably for the 
evolution of RMB centres. Rather than focusing on IFC complementarities, future research should 
therefore delve deeper into the politics of change behind IFC development.  
The findings highlight that the role of states in offshore finance is multi-dimensional rather 
than singular: the Chinese government not only regulates and stabilises offshore RMB centres; it 
actively creates and expands them to achieve its objective of building a global offshore RMB market. 
Similarly, the UK government was as a decisive enabling force behind London’s first-mover 
advantage, by cultivating close relations with Chinese policy elites. By specifying these variegated 
roles of the state, this paper extends the focus on the state’s regulatory function in the offshore 
finance literature. It also lends empirical support to existing claims within this literature that 
‘offshore’ transactions can occur in places typically considered to be  ‘onshore’ money centre such as 
London (Clark and Monk, 2013).  
Finally, this paper adds to debates in the global financial networks literature that the attraction 
of offshore finance stems from ‘jurisdictional autonomy rather than being centres of finance 
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professionals or expertise’ (Clark et al, 2015: 244). This perspective suggests that, in offshore finance, 
IFC characteristics matter less than the nature of jurisdictions. The findings of this study suggest that 
this claim may not be universally applicable to all forms of offshore finance. Although important, 
finance-friendly laws and regulations within the subnational jurisdiction of the City of London are 
not the main determinant of its appeal in the case of offshore RMB finance. It was instead London’s 
capacity to contribute to RMB internationalisation. In this endeavour, jurisdictional autonomy was 
less important. What mattered for Chinese policymakers was whether a place had strong political 
relations with China, a track record of foreign exchange expertise and a 24-hour bridging point to 
trade with East and West. These ‘resources’ supported Chinese efforts of creating a global offshore 
RMB market. The demonstrated centrality of financial centre characteristics in RMB offshore 
finance therefore calls for revising existing premises about the making of offshore finance.  
 At the policy level, the revealed tensions between state elites and London’s financial sector 
clarify that the Chinese government can catalyse but not command offshore RMB markets outside its 
own jurisdiction. This is because, unlike Hong Kong, foreign RMB hubs such as London are not 
directly controlled by the Chinese party-state. From a policy perspective this is instructive, as it 
highlights that the emphasis on tight government control, in fact, undermines the creation of a global 
offshore RMB market. For Chinese policymakers, the success of RMB internationalisation will 
therefore depend on their political willingness to loosen their grip over capital markets including the 
recruitment policies of their financial institutions. 
 For foreign jurisdictions hosting RMB centres including Frankfurt or Luxemburg, this study 
highlights the conditional nature of growing offshore RMB business. The case of London revealed 
that strong inter-state relations are a crucial enabling condition behind the formation of new RMB 
hubs. Yet, shared policy interests between Chinese authorities and overseas governments are not a 
sufficient condition for their subsequent integration into existing IFC structures. The successful 
development of RMB business depends on securing private sector support at home. This requires 
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foreign governments to adopt a more inclusive approach that is mutually beneficial for public and 
private sector agents alike. Without the continuous alignment of public-private interests, the 
development of RMB centres outside China will likely remain a tale of selective adaptation. 
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Figure 1: The geography of RQFII hubs 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ own; figures from SAFE 
Note: RQFII investment quota in ¥bn; RQFII licences by approval year  
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Figure 2: Distribution of RQFII quota across top RMB hubsix (RMB bn) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  author’s own; based on Z-Ben (2015), CSRC (2015); SAFE (2015) 
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Endnotes 																																																									
i Before 2004, RMB-denominated trading was not allowed outside of China.  
ii Since Hong Kong is a special administrative region of the People’s Republic of China, it is not treated as a ‘foreign’ 
offshore RMB hub. iii	Note that Hong Kong was the first offshore RMB centre established outside Mainland China. However, as a formal 
part of Chinese territory, the Mainland Chinese government directly shapes its institutional landscape. Given this special 
political status, Hong Kong does therefore not provide a template of ‘organisational mimicry’ for RMB centres located in 
Western contexts.		iv	Financial globalisation is defined as the free movement of financial flows across national boundaries without 
restrictions, enabled by the international diffusion of liberalising measures (Büthe and Mattli, 2011).	
v This paper defines ‘institutions’ as formal or informal norms, rules and enforcement mechanisms that are grounded in 
the common expectations between social agents and therefore guide their behaviour. 
vi Foreign indirect investments differ from foreign direct investments (FDI). In the case of FDI, the investor owns the 
assets himself and may thus exert a significant degree of control over the investee company. Investments typically count 
as FDI if an investor owns at least 10 percent of a firm’s voting stock (OECD, 2008). In contrast, foreign indirect 
investments are made by foreign institutions that pool investor money to buy or sell financial assets in another country. 
Examples include investments by foreign mutual funds into stocks listed in another economy. 	
vii This is because the UK firm did not sell any of its own RQFII quota to provide the American company with access to 
RMB market. The transaction between the two parties did not involve the booking of financial instruments but merely the 
provision of financial advice. Consequently, this type of financial service would not classify as ‘offshore finance’ 
according to Kurdle’s definition. viii	In addition to securing RQFII hub status in 2013, London was granted permission to set up the first Western RMB 
clearing bank, following a 2014 state visit by China’s President. ix	Whether an IFC counts a ‘top offshore RMB centre’ is measured based on the respective volumes of both allocated 
quota allowance to the IFC and quota allocated to licensed investors. 	
